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Chapter 2
The Market for Financial Advisers
John A. Turner and Dana M. Muir
Many individuals lack basic financial knowledge (e.g., McCarthy and Turner,
2000; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006), and hence they would likely benefit from
financial advice. Pension plan sponsors also need financial advice when choos-
ing what types of plans to offer, setting up pension plans, choosing investment
options for 401(k) plans (by far the most common type of employer-provided
plan), managing the investments of defined benefit (DB) plans, establishing
pensionplans for executives, andhiring serviceproviders. This chapter focuses
on financial advice related to preparing for retirement, considering advice
provided to both individuals and pension plan sponsors.
We begin by providing background on ways that advisers interact with
their clients, and on the scope of their investment advice. Second, we
discuss the types of firms providing advice and requirements for some of
the certifications that financial advisers use. These certifications provide
individuals and plan sponsors a way to assess adviser qualifications. Third,
we investigate issues related to the level and disclosure of fees financial
advisers charge. Next, we explain how the structure and level of advisory
fees may result in conflicts of interest that can affect the quality of advice
provided. Then we outline how the US legal and regulatory environments
are evolving in response to conflicts of interest and investor confusion
about standards of care identified in several studies as being potentially
problematic. Finally, conclusions appear in the final section.1
Financial advice for individuals
First we discuss the ways in which financial advice can be provided and
topics covered in financial advice.
How financial advice can be provided for managing
investments
Financial advisers can provide clients assistance with their investments by
offering education, decision support, advice, or marketing information;
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alternatively, they can manage the individual’s investments themselves.
Decision support is education targeted to help a client reach a decision.
Marketing information may appear to the client to be unbiased advice, but
it is designed to sell a product.
Many advisers also assist their clients in carrying out their advice. If an
adviser provides financial management, he makes investment decisions
and carries them out without involving the individual investor in the deci-
sion. Some 401(k) plans offer employees managed accounts, where the
individual’s assets are professionally managed. This option is also available
for non-pension accounts. Advice and marketing materials of some service
providers encourage clients to have professionally managed accounts,
which tend to generate higher ongoing fees. We focus in this study on
investment advice, and not asset management.
An alternative to a financial adviser is advice generated by financial
planning software, some of which is available for free over the Internet
(Turner and Witte, 2009). A further alternative to a financial adviser, at
least for investment advice, is a target date investment fund, in which the
asset mix of a diversified portfolio is automatically adjusted to take into
account a shortening investment horizon as the client’s expected retire-
ment date approaches.
We focus here on advice that includes interaction with a financial
adviser. The financial adviser provides advice as to financial decisions,
and the individual decides whether to follow the advice. An adviser can
provide advice through a variety of methods, including online, by tele-
phone, at call centers or help desks, at company offices, at group seminars,
or in one-on-one sessions.
Topics covered and topics often overlooked
The retirement-related topics on which individuals may need financial
advice are far broader than investments. They can include when to leave
work, when to claim Social Security benefits; and for those with a pension
or personal savings, whether to roll over a 401(k) plan to an Individual
Retirement Account (IRA), how to liquidate assets in retirement, and
whether to purchase an annuity.
Some advisers focus only on investments, and do not provide advice on
some of the other decisions individuals must make concerning retirement.
For example, some advisory companies focusing on investments note that
they do not provide tax or legal advice (e.g., T. Rowe Price, 2011a, 2011b).
Nevertheless, despite the disclaimer provided for legal reasons, some do
discuss tax considerations related to selecting investments and deciding in
what order to sell investments in retirement.
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A survey of free financial planning software available online found that
most programs do not provide advice as to purchasing an annuity, even
when confronted with a scenario rigged to make purchasing an annuity
desirable (Turner, 2010). One mutual fund company we contacted indi-
cated that few of its clients sought advice as to how to take pension payouts.
For that reason, the firm’s decision to not provide advice concerning
annuities was partly demand-driven. Another reason it cited is that finan-
cial experts do not have a standard methodology for determining how
much a client should annuitize. By contrast, life insurance companies are
expected to advise concerning purchase of an annuity.
One reason some financial advisers have not recommended annuities
in the past is that annuitization would reduce their assets under manage-
ment, and thus their fees. More recently, insurers have introduced variable
annuities that allow the adviser to still manage the asset base and capture
management fees. For instance, in some variable annuities, the account is
typically invested in mutual funds chosen by the client during the accumu-
lation phase. During the payout phase, generally the client has the choice
of receiving a fixed payout, or having a payout that varies depending on the
investment performance of the underlying assets.
Advisers’ employers and credentials
Financial advisers differ in the types of companies they work for and in the
certifications they obtain.
Companies providing financial advice
Companies providing financial advice include banks and trust companies
(e.g., UBS), mutual fund companies (e.g., Vanguard), financial advisory
companies (e.g., Veritat), brokerage companies (e.g., TD Ameritrade), and
insurance companies (e.g., MetLife). Accounting and law firms also pro-
vide financial advice. With financial companies acquiring each other, facili-
tated by more permissive regulation, the distinctions as to the nature of
companies are increasingly blurred (e.g., Bank of America Merrill Lynch,
2011). In 2010, 19 percent of investment advisory firms that provided finan-
cial planning services also provided brokerage services, while 27 percent also
sold insurance (GAO, 2011b).
Some financial services companies provide only advice, while others
only investment management. Some advisers offer the option of advice
only or investment management (TD Ameritrade, 2011). Financial Engines
is a company that began by providing financial advice to 401(k) plan
participants through employers sponsoring 401(k) plans. From its early
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experience it observed that often its clients did not take the steps necessary
to follow its advice, so it now primarily manages 401(k) accounts, for which
it accepts fiduciary responsibility (Financial Engines, 2011). By contrast,
many companies that provide financial advice to plan sponsors do not
accept fiduciary responsibility (Simon, 2004). Guided Choice (2011) and
Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2011) provide advice to 401(k) partici-
pants through arrangements with plan sponsors. Using a different business
model, Smart401(k) (2011) provides investment advice directly to individ-
ual 401(k) plan participants. On the websites of these three companies,
there is no indication that they accept fiduciary responsibility.
Insurance companies may also provide financial advice relating to the
marketing of various insurance products, including variable annuities and
other payout products. The advice they provide can also go beyond these
traditional areas: for example, MetLife Securities, Inc., a subsidiary of
MetLife (the holding company for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company),
offers traditional financial planning assistance, including fee-based financial
planning (MetLife, 2011). An insurance agent who works for an insurance
company is referred to as a ‘captive agent.’ Independent agents who sell the
products of multiple companies are called insurance brokers. In both cases,
compensation is often based on commissions (Kolakowski, 2011).
As a general matter, advisory firms must register as investment advisers
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which is an agency of
the federal government, or with a state government, depending on the
amount of assets receiving continuous and regular supervisory or manage-
ment services (Assets Under Management, or AUM). The minimum
amount for required SEC registration as of 2011 is $100 million (SEC,
2011d). Firms with AUM of below $100 million must register with state
government regulators.
An advisory firm that does not meet the minimum AUM test for SEC
purposes may still register with the SEC instead of state regulators if it is a
‘pension consultant’ that provides investment advice to employee benefit
plans or a plan fiduciary on a minimum aggregate asset value. That min-
imum increased in 2011 to $200 million. The SEC’s rationale is that
pension consultants who provide various services regarding large amounts
of plan assets may have an effect on national markets, even if they do not
technically have AUM (SEC, 2011e: 42,959).
Professional certifications of financial advisers
BrightScope, Inc. (2011), a company started in 2009 that analyzes 401(k)
plans, argues that 401(k) plan sponsors needmore information about invest-
ment advisers than they currently have. Its website provides information on
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about 450,000 investment advisers, including their experience and employ-
ment history. The database is slated to over a million names, once advisers
registered with individual states are included (Bliman, 2011).
In addition, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) main-
tains a database on 1.3 million current and former stock brokers registered
with FINRA, and 17,000 current and former brokerage firms registered
with FINRA (FINRA, 2011b). FINRA is a private-sector self-regulatory
organization for broker-dealers. Private-sector self-regulation of brokerage
firms is generally not found in other countries, with the government having
sole regulatory responsibility.
The term ‘financial adviser’ is not regulated by law, and financial advisers
have a wide range of professional backgrounds. They can be accountants,
attorneys, estate planners, insurance agents, stock brokers, and investment
advisers (Certified Financial Planner Board, 2011c). FINRA (2011a) warns
consumers that the terms financial analyst, financial adviser, financial consult-
ant, financial planner, investment consultant, and wealth manager are generic
job titles that are generally not regulated. That is, these titles do not
necessarily indicate any given level of expertise or credential.
The requirements for certifications used by financial advisers vary
considerably. FINRA (2011a) lists over 100 professional designations for
financial advisers. While some designations require examinations and con-
tinuing education, others merely signify that the certificate holder has paid
membership dues (GAO, 2011b).2 Certifications that financial advisers
use include Certified Financial Planner, Chartered Financial Analyst, Char-
tered Investment Counselor, Personal Financial Specialist, Chartered
Financial Consultant, Chartered Life Underwriter, and Certified Employee
Benefit Specialist. Some financial planners obtain none of these certifica-
tions but instead have educational backgrounds as attorneys, accountants,
economists, or MBAs.
Certified Financial Planner
The Certified Financial Planner (CFP) certification is administered by a pri-
vate-sector organization, the CFP Board. In dealing with clients, CFPs agree to
follow the principles of confidentiality, integrity, objectivity, competence,
fairness, professionalism, and diligence (Certified Financial Planner Board,
2011a). CFPs must have at least a Bachelor’s degree and have taken specific
courses, either at an academic institution or proprietary courses approved by
the CFP Board that cover topics on the CFP certification examination. Having
a Ph.D. in Economics automatically meets the education requirement, but it
would generally not adequately prepare someone to take the examination.
Beginning in 2012, the education requirement includes completion of a
financial plan development course approved by the CFP Board.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/9/2013, SPi
The Market for Financial Advisers 17
Once the education requirement is met, a candidate can sit for the CFP
certification examination, which takes 10 hours over two days; the exam fee
is $595. Topics covered include insurance planning and risk management,
employee benefits planning, investment planning, income tax planning,
retirement planning, and estate planning. Having passed the examination,
the candidate must satisfy ethics requirements concerning past illegal
activity and agree to adhere to ethical standards in the future. The candi-
date must also have at least three years of qualifying work experience. Once
certified, the CFP must take 30 hours of continuing education every two
years, including 2 hours on professional conduct.
Chartered Financial Analyst
The Chartered Financial Analyst Institute has more than 100,000 members
worldwide, making it the world’s largest association of investment profes-
sionals (Chartered Financial Analyst Institute, 2011). The Chartered Financial
Analyst (CFA) educational program requires passing three examinations for
which candidates spend on average 300 hours preparing for each. Candidates
can complete the program in eighteen months, but, on average, take four
years. To enter the education program, an individual must have a Bachelor’s
degree or be in the final year of earning that degree, or have four years of
qualified professional work experience.
The CFA program focuses on corporate finance and investments, includ-
ing derivatives and alternative investments such as real estate, commodities,
and hedge funds. By comparison, the CFP program includes those issues
and also covers financial planning issues more broadly. For example, the
CFP educational program has a section on Social Security benefits not
covered in the CFA program (Certified Financial Planner Board, 2011b).
Similarly, annuities are discussed in the CFP program, but they are not
covered in the syllabus for the CFA program.
Chartered Investment Counselor
TheInvestmentAdviserAssociation(IAA)hasestablished theChartered Invest-
ment Counselor (CIC) program (IAA, 2011). A CIC must be a CFA and meet
additional requirements established by the IAA, including being employed by
an IAAmember firm and having five years of qualifying experience.
Personal Financial Specialist
The Personal Financial Specialist (PFS) program enables Certified Public
Accountants (CPAs) to receive professional recognition for their expertise
in personal financial planning (American Institute of CPAs, 2011). CPA is
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the title for accountants who have passed a qualifying examination and
have met state requirements concerning education and experience. A PFS
must be a member of the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants (AICPA). More than 3,000 CPAs have the PFS certification, or about
1 percent of the membership of the AICPA (Drucker, 2005). According to
the AICPA, the PFS’s knowledge about tax issues distinguishes this creden-
tial from others. Nonetheless, many CPAs who do not have the designation
engage in aspects of providing financial advice (Drucker, 2005).
The PFS examination takes over 7 hours. The PFS must have at least two
years of full-time business or teaching experience related to financial
planning, and must complete at least 80 hours of personal financial educa-
tion. The PFS must pass the PFS examination. The cost of the examination
is $400 for AICPA members.
Chartered Financial Consultant
The certifications discussed thus far are awarded by industry or professional
groups, but some certifications are awarded by academic institutions. One
example is the Chartered Financial Consultant (ChFC) program is offered
through the American College in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania (The American
College, 2011a). The ChFC is trained to meet the financial planning needs
of individuals, professionals, and small business owners. The ChFC must
complete nine courses—seven required and two elective. The seven required
courses include Fundamentals of Insurance Planning and Fundamentals of
Estate Planning. The cost of admission to the program is $135, and the cost
per course is $599. According to the American College, the ChFC program
has more extensive education requirements than any other financial plan-
ning credential. The education program can be done through self-study or
through attending live webinars.
Chartered Life Underwriter
The Chartered Life Underwriter (CLU) certification is also offered by the
American College (The American College, 2011b). The CLU program
participant must take five required courses and three elective courses,
some of which overlap with the ChFC courses. The cost of each course is
approximately $600. Topics include life insurance law, insurance and estate
planning, insurance for business owners and professionals, and retirement
planning. Both the ChFC and CLU programs require three years of full-
time professional experience within the past five years. Both require adher-
ence to an ethical code.
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Other professional designations include the Certified Fund Specialist
(CFS), Certified Investment Management Analyst (CIMA), and actuarial
designations such as Fellow of the Society of Actuaries (FSA).
Fees for financial advice
This section discusses the types of fees charged, issues related to the clarity
and usefulness of the disclosure of fees to individuals, fees charged to
individuals, fees charged to plan sponsors, and the compensation received
by financial advisers.
Types of fees
Financial advisers charge fees in various ways (Anspach, 2011a; Maxey, 2011).
1. They charge a fee as a percent of the client’s account balance or the
amount of assets they help manage. The larger the minimum account
balance and the larger the account, the lower fee percentages tend to be,
due to economies of scale. This is the traditional and most common
approach, accounting for 85 percent of the revenues of advisory firms in
2010 (Maxey, 2011).
This approach not only provides incentives for the adviser to attempt to
increase the individual’s asset base, but it may also encourage too much risk
taking. In addition, the adviser may have an incentive to not let money exit
the asset under management, such as purchasing an annuity or insurance,
paying down a mortgage, or drawing down assets to postpone taking Social
Security benefits (Maxey, 2011). The adviser may also have an incentive
to make moves that bring money into the asset base, such as rolling over a
401(k) plan into an IRA.
Finally, fees based on AUM may give rise to what are known as ‘reverse
churning’ claims. In churning claims, clients accuse brokers of changing
their investments in order to increase commissions payable to the broker.
Reverse churning claims occur when advisers allegedly ignore accounts by
failing to properly monitor or reallocate investments, because the adviser’s
compensation is based on AUM.
2. Advisers may receive commissions on insurance or financial products
they sell to their clients. This compensation may be entirely based on sales
commissions, or partly on referral fees paid by third parties. To the client, the
advice may appear to be free, but in actuality the client is paying through the
fees that thirdparties charge formanaging the investments, conducting trades,
etc. This approach has the problem that advisers may have an incentive to buy
and sell products when they get a commission for trades (Maxey, 2011).
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3. Many advisers collect both fees and commissions, acting under
the descriptor of fee-based adviser versus the fee-only adviser. An adviser
receiving both fees from the client and commissions from third parties may
rebate some or all of the commissions received to the client through a
reduction in fees. This arrangement is called a fee offset.
4. Advisers may charge an hourly rate for their time spent advising
clients, or a flat fee for a specific project.
5. Advisers may charge a quarterly or annual retainer fee if the client has
an ongoing need for advice, or they may charge a fixed annual mainten-
ance fee.
6. Advisers may charge a fee based on the client’s income, or based on
the client’s net worth (not just their portfolio holdings).
The SEC also lists two other ways financial advisers might charge fees: (a)
subscription fees for a newsletter or periodical; and (b) performance-based
fees tied to the rate of return the client receives on his investments.
Performance-based fees can only be charged to wealthy clients.
Advisers who charge fees as a percentage of account balances generally
establish minimum fee levels by requiring that their clients have a min-
imum amount of assets to invest; such asset minimums range from $20,000
to $500,000. For example, Merrill Lynch has a minimum of $250,000 in
investable assets for one class of advice, while its Merrill Edge Advisory
Center is for people with $20,000 to $250,000 in assets to invest and for
whom a lower level of service is provided (Merrill Edge, 2011). Vanguard’s
financial advisers use a minimum of $500,000 (Vanguard, 2011a). The
minimum asset requirements for clients of a number of companies are
high compared to the average households’ stock holdings. The median
holdings of stock outside retirement plans by households aged 45–54 with
stock was $45,000 in 2007 (Bucks et al., 2009).
Different fee structures may be preferable to different types of investors.
For example, an hourly fee or a flat fee would presumably be preferable to
individuals with insufficient assets to meet the minimums set by advisers
charging asset-based fees (Maxey, 2011).
Disclosure of advisory fees to individuals
Fee levels charged by financial advisers vary widely, but few companies
compete based on fees when marketing their services. Financial advisers,
even low-cost ones, generally do not highlight fee information on their
websites. Generally, websites do not contain information on fees, or if
they do, that information can only be obtained with effort. For example,
the main pages at the Vanguard (2011b) financial advice website do not
report information as to asset management. This information for asset
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management can be obtained with sufficient diligence by following links,
but fees for advice are apparently not disclosed on the website. (Van-
guard does mention on the first webpage for advice that it provides
advice at low cost.) GuidedChoice (2011) indicates on its website that it
favors transparency in fees, but it does not provide fee information.
Merrill Lynch (2010) never mentions fees on its Global Wealth & Invest-
ment Management website. While it might be expected that footnotes
would contain technical information of interest only to specialists, TD
Ameritrade discloses its fee structure for account management in small
print in the third paragraph of a footnote on its website (TD Ameritrade,
2011).
Individuals can obtain information about fees by going to the website of
the SEC and examining disclosure forms, called ADV forms, for different
advisory companies. Yet few individuals are likely to be aware of this source
of information, and even fewer use it. As part of the requirement that
advisory firms file an ADV form, the SEC requires that registered invest-
ment advisers provide a written disclosure statement (called a brochure)
to clients and prospective clients. Disclosure includes information concern-
ing fees. It also requires advisers to make disclosures as fiduciaries,
including material facts about the advisory relationship and any conflicts
of interest.
Fees for investment advice to individual investors are tax deductible,
but fees for investment management are not deductible. Tax deductible
financial advisory fees are disclosed on the Internal Revenue Service
(taxing authority) IRS Form 1099 provided to clients by their financial
services companies after the calendar year has ended; that disclosure does
not include management fees and transaction costs. Transaction costs
resulting from financial advice involving active management, which are
fees the participant pays, are rarely, if ever, disclosed to clients (Turner
and Witte, 2008). Advisers acting as brokers are not required to disclose
commissions at the point of sale (Maxey, 2011). That information is
disclosed later, when the individual receives the confirmation of the
transaction.
An issue related to the disclosure of fees is whether such disclosure is
used by pension participants, or whether the added cost of disclosure fails
to benefit participants. The effects of the disclosure may depend for some
investors on the format of the disclosure. Hastings and Mitchell (2011)
show that people with low levels of financial literacy are more affected by
the formats in which fee information is disclosed, compared to people with
high levels of financial literacy who are more likely to understand the
information whatever the format used.
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Level of advisory fees charged to individuals
In practice, the level of advisory fees varies widely. For example, T. Rowe
Price (2011a) offered financial advice in 2011 to its clients at a flat fee of
$250, with the fee waived for clients with $500,000 or more invested, or who
made a one-time purchase of $100,000 or more.
Motley Fool (2011) has an innovative way of providing low-cost financial
advice that involves greater participation by the client than is generally
true. This program, called the TMF Money Advisor, charged a flat annual
fee of $195 in 2011. Part of the cost of providing individual financial advice is
the cost of gathering information from the individual and inputting that
information into a computer model. Motley Fool’s clients input their own
financial information into anonline computermodel, taking about anhour to
do so (not including the time required to gather the information). Subse-
quently, afinancial adviser at a call center can lookat the informationprovided
online and discuss a computer-generated financial plan with the clients.
One company charges fees at the rate of 1 percent of the individual’s
Adjusted Gross Income plus 0.5 percent of their net worth (excluding
closely held businesses), with the second fee declining to 0.25 percent
and then 0.1 percent as net worth grows (Maxey, 2011).
Hourly rates charged by advisers vary widely (Anspach, 2011a), with the
average hourly fee starting at around $175 an hour in 2011 (Motley Fool,
2011). In practice, we found that company websites rarely reported hourly
rates; instead, companies generally require clients to call to find out their
hourly rates.
New Means Financial Planning (2011) is a fee-only service in New Hamp-
shire that does provide detailed information about its fees. A financial
consultation for clients in their 20s and early 30s costs $800 to $1,000.
A typical fee to assess how much life insurance and other insurance
a person needs ranges from $600 to $1,000. Advice on investments in a
401(k) plan ranges between $400 and $800 per plan. An assessment of the
person’s entire portfolio ranges from $1,000 to $2,200. Advice on retire-
ment planning ranges from $1,000 to $2,000. A comprehensive financial
plan costs between $2,200 and $4,400. Alternatively, a client can receive
advisory services at an hourly rate of $200 (in 2011 dollars).
Advisers who charge fees as a percentage of assets may have formulas that
take several factors into account. For example, as well as the amount of
assets, they may take into account the complexity of the client’s investment
strategy, the frequency of meetings or investment reviews, and the extent of
trading activity.
Some financial advisers charge insurance companies for recommending
purchase of an annuity. For example, Schwab (2011a) could recommend
purchase of an annuity, but only from insurance companies that
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compensate Schwab for its role as agent for the sale and servicing of
annuity contracts. Generally, Schwab’s compensation is based on the
amount to be annuitized and the type of annuity. A fixed deferred annuity
in 2011 had a 1.50 percent commission paid at the time of purchase, with a
0.65 percent trail commission, paid annually. A trail commission offsets the
disincentive to Schwab of removing assets from the base of AUM. A fixed
immediate annuity has a 3.50 percent commission paid at time of purchase.
These costs are in addition to the charges of the insurance company, and
they presumably are passed on to the client.
Level of advisory fees charged to plan sponsors
Plan sponsors often hire financial advisers to help them make decisions
concerning the pension plans they sponsor. For 401(k) plans, these deci-
sions relate to the investment options they offer participants, and also to
financial education and advice provided to participants. For DB plans,
decisions tend to relate to the selection of investments for the pension
fund.
No unique source exists for examining fees charged to pension plan
sponsors. Edelman Financial Services establishes 401(k) plans for com-
panies for a one-time setup fee that is not disclosed at its website. It will
then manage the 401(k) plan, including providing advice to participants
for a flat annual fee (also not disclosed at its website; Edelman Financial
Services, 2011). To obtain information about those fees, a plan sponsor
must directly contact the firm, which makes it more costly in terms of time
and effort to compare fees.
Compensation received by financial advisers
Users of financial advice need to understand the fees they pay directly to
their adviser or adviser’s employer, as well as how their adviser is compen-
sated, including indirect effects on his compensation such as compensa-
tion from third parties. Compensation from third parties can also affect the
advice that the adviser provides. The US Department of Labor (2011)
specifies that compensation a financial adviser receives can include ‘com-
missions, salary, bonuses, awards, promotions, or other things of value,’ as
well as fees. ‘Other things of value’ include trips and gifts. The precise level
of compensation the adviser receives may be difficult to determine when
the adviser receives commissions for products he sells, as well as fees.
Advisers who work independently, including those who sell long-term
care insurance, may be paid entirely through commissions they receive for
products they sell, or may receive fees, or both. Regarding advisers who
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work for companies, most companies do not explain how their advisers are
compensated, and it can be difficult to obtain information on how com-
pensation by third parties affects the compensation of financial advisers
employed by a firm. For example, Benjamin F. Edwards & Co. discloses that
it receives third-party payments but indicates that those payments do not
directly affect the compensation of employees acting as financial consult-
ants. It discloses further that ‘it is possible, through various compensation
arrangements, that financial consultants may indirectly benefit from these
payments’ (Benjamin F. Edwards & Co., 2011), but the firm does not
disclose on its website exactly how third-party payments affect a consult-
ant’s compensation.
Some financial services companies offer financial advisers options for
employment and compensation. Under one option, the advisers are affili-
ated with the company, but they remain responsible for establishing their
office. Under the second option, agents are employees of the company
which provides them full office support. Under both options, compen-
sation is based on the business they generate. Agents receive a smaller
percentage of their fees and commissions under the second option than
the first option.
Some financial advisers also pay CPAs and other professionals referral
fees. For example, CPAs may receive referral fees when they refer a client
to a financial adviser, ranging from 10–20 percent, to as much as 40 percent,
of the fee charged by the adviser (Drucker, 2005). In addition, independent
financial advisers recommended by Charles Schwab pay Schwab a fee for
referrals (Schwab, 2011a). These fees are at least partly passed on to clients.
Issues concerning financial advice provided
to individuals
After identifying a qualified financial adviser with expertise that meets their
needs, the consumer receiving financial advice may still encounter difficul-
ties. For example, people may not understand the information or advice
they receive, and such problems may be age-related (Karp and Wilson,
2011). In addition, people may receive biased advice that may not be in
their best interest when they have difficulty evaluating the quality of the
advice received. According to a survey by the Investor Protection Trust,
about 20 percent of adults aged 65 or older report having ‘been taken
advantage of financially in terms of an inappropriate investment, unreason-
ably high fees for financial services, or outright fraud’ (Infogroup/ORC,
2010). Other problems they may encounter are inaccurate information,
such as use of overly optimistic rate of return assumptions in financial
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projections (Turner and Witte, 2009), or lack of advice on certain topics,
such as annuitization (Turner, 2010).
Next we turn to problems in understanding advice caused by termin-
ology, advice relating to the marketing of products where a fiduciary duty
does not apply, and problems in quality of advice caused by conflicts of
interest that advisers may have.
Terminology
Financial advice can be hard to understand because of the terminology
advisers use: for instance, consumers may be unclear as to the difference
between a fee and a commission, or know what a load is. A fee is a payment
the adviser receives from the client for providing advice. A commission is a
payment the adviser receives for selling a financial product. A load is the
commission investors pay when they purchase retail mutual funds. Other
examples include ‘wrap fees’ and ‘discretionary versus non-discretionary
assets.’ A wrap fee is a fee charged for providing a bundle of services, without
breaking out the charges for the different components of the bundle.
Discretionary assets are assets for which the client has delegated responsi-
bility for management to the management company. The fine print relating
to financial advice is often difficult to comprehend. As an example, prospec-
tuses may mention 12b-1 fees, with no explanation as to what they are. These
fees are marketing or distribution fees charged by mutual funds.
Advice related to marketing where a fiduciary
duty does not apply
When marketing products to consumers, financial service providers often
do not have a duty to provide advice in the best interest of the client (GAO,
2011a). For example, many insurance companies market variable annu-
ities. These are investment products until retirement, at which point the
investor has the option of converting them to annuities, with one option
being converting them to variable annuities whose payouts vary depending
on the investment performance of the underlying assets. One firm suggests
that variable annuities offer for market appreciation with tax-deferred
accumulation and future income. The SEC, however, suggests that many
people may be better off investing the maximum amounts in their IRA and
401(k) plans before purchasing variable annuities (SEC, 2011f ).
Conflicts of interest can arise with financial advisers at several points in
the 401(k) decision-making process. For instance, plan participants may be
affected by conflicts of interest when sponsors receive advice as to what
investment options to include. This determines the choice set, given
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participation in the plan. In recent court cases, some 401(k) plan partici-
pants allege they lost millions of dollars collectively because of investment
options with high fees that benefited their plans’ investment managers.
Participants may pay too much in fees when low-fee options are not avail-
able (GAO, 2011a).
Moreover, financial advisers may encourage pension participants to not
contribute more than the amount necessary to receive the full employer
match, and instead to put extra savings into financial products outside the
plan if the adviser receives commissions on those products (Pettus and
Kesmodel, 2010).
Plan participants may also be affected by conflicts of interest of advisers
when they select funds from among the investment options available to
them. Some participants may not distinguish between financial education,
where the provider does not have a fiduciary obligation, and financial
advice, where the provider may have a fiduciary obligation. Participants
may become confused, for example, if advisers highlight only the products
of the company providing the education (GAO, 2011a).
Sometimes a financial adviser may fail to explain the value of selecting
low-fee funds, for instance when the adviser is connected to a mutual fund
family, so he may recommend only those funds without mentioning fees.
The potential magnitude of this conflict can be assessed from data on
expense ratios. In 2010, according to the Investment Company Institute
(ICI), the asset-weighted expense ratio for stock mutual funds invested
in 401(k) plans was 71 basis points (ICI, 2011a). This figure represents
the result of decisions by plan sponsors as to what funds to offer, as well as
decisions by plan participants as to what funds to choose. This figure is
higher than the expense ratios for institutional low-cost stock index mutual
funds. While 401(k) participants may receive more services than do individ-
ual investors, which raises costs, employers could negotiate for institutional
rates to lower costs.
Participants may also be adversely affected by conflicts of interest by
advisers when participants leave the companies sponsoring their 401(k)
plans. That is, some individuals may encounter biased advice when con-
sidering whether to roll over a 401(k) plan to an IRA. Research suggests
that providers may gain higher fees from consumers moving their money to
investments outside 401(k) plans (GAO, 2011a). Mutual fund companies
and insurers encourage individuals to roll over their 401(k) plan accounts
from former employers into IRAs. This may not be in the best interests of
individuals, due to possibly paying higher fees. Individuals may also
encounter advice to roll over their 401(k) accounts, even when not seeking
advice, since mutual funds advertise their advice on television and in other
media. The US Department of Labor (2011) currently does not consider
this type of advice to be investment advice, and thus it is not covered by
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fiduciary standards. Also, individuals may be affected by conflicts of interest
when they seek advice as to the investments of their IRAs.
The potential magnitude of the costs resulting from advice concerning
rollovers from 401(k) plans to IRAs is large. Between 1998 and 2007, more
than 80 percent of funds contributed to IRAs came from rollovers from
other plans, primarily 401(k) plans but also including other defined con-
tribution (DC) plans and DB plans (GAO, 2011b). In 2010, IRAs held $4.5
trillion in assets versus $2.9 trillion in 401(k) plans (Investment Company
Institute, 2011b); accordingly, IRA rollovers are one of the main drivers of
the structure of the US retirement income system. IRA account holders
typically pay higher fees than 401(k) plan participants—about 25 to 30
basis points a year higher (GAO, 2011a).
Inertia would tend to cause 401(k) participants to keep their 401(k)
accounts with their former employers where sensible. Inertia has been
cited as a powerful force regarding employee contributions to 401(k)
plans (Choi et al., 2004). The force of inertia, however, has been overcome
with respect to rollovers in a major way. One explanation for this phenom-
enon may be that individuals receive advice from mutual funds and other
financial service providers, encouraging them to roll over their 401(k)
accounts to earn higher fees.
Conflicts of interest affecting individual investors
For individuals holding non-qualified investments (investments not ben-
efiting from the preferential tax treatment received by pensions), the
potential for conflicts of interest depends on the choice of investments.
Due to how advisers are compensated, some may provide biased advice to
individuals concerning the choices between mutual funds and individual
stocks; for example, some advisers are paid by mutual funds that their
clients select, biasing them in favor of those funds. Others may receive
higher compensation for recommending individual stocks in a portfolio
they manage than for recommending low-cost mutual funds. At Schwab,
advisers receive 0.0028 percent of assets as a fee for funds invested in
individual stocks, 0.0350 percent of assets for money invested in mutual
funds, 0.0595 percent for assets invested in Schwab-managed portfolios,
and 0.0770 percent for assets enrolled in Schwab Private Client where the
adviser provides ongoing services (Schwab, 2011b). At Ameriprise (2011),
some employees receive higher compensation if they recommend and sell
affiliated mutual funds, than if they sell mutual funds not affiliated with
Ameriprise. Conflicts of interest also arise when a firm underwriting an IPO
(Initial Public Offering of stock) also provides advice to retail clients,
encouraging them to purchase the stock (Loewenstein et al., 2011).
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Financial advisers charging ongoing fees may also be biased toward
recommending active management associated with higher transaction
costs, rather than passive management in index funds, so as to boost the
commissions from the broker-dealer that the adviser receives (GAO,
2011a). Schwab (2011b) compensates some advisers based on the clients
increasing the amount of trading that they do.
Issues affecting the quality of financial advice
provided to plan sponsors
Conflicts of interest affecting the quality of advice are also relevant to plan
sponsors, because some mutual funds pay advisers who recommend funds.
These payments can create a conflict of interest, if an adviser directly or
indirectly receives compensation from marketing certain funds. Further-
more, low-cost funds tend not to offer such payments. For example, some
mutual funds offer share classes with no revenue sharing and lower
expense ratios, alongside share classes with revenue sharing and higher
expense ratios (Reish and Ashton, 2011). Revenue sharing occurs when a
mutual fund pays an adviser to recommend the fund (Moon, 2004). The
payments may be characterized as paying for expenses relating to selling
the fund. At least one service provider—Securion—deals with the issue of
revenue sharing by passing on all revenue sharing to the plan, crediting the
amounts to the individual accounts that generated the revenue sharing
(Reish and Ashton, 2011).
The amount of revenue-sharing payments advisers receive varies consid-
erably. One study found that payments range from 5 to 125 basis points
annually (GAO, 2011b). Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA; US private pension law) requires pension plan sponsors to con-
sider conflicts of interest when selecting service providers (GAO, 2011a).
For example, an investment adviser may purposely not negotiate for the
lowest transaction fees for plan participants for buying and selling shares.
As a result, the broker-dealer would pay the investment adviser out of these
higher fees (GAO, 2011a).
Evolving legal and regulatory issues
The US legal system has struggled in recent years with the regulation of
financial advisers, including regulation of the services they provide to
employee benefit plans sponsored by private-sector employers. The con-
tinuing evolution of the legal and regulatory issues may be attributed to a
number of factors. The increase in assets held in 401(k)-style plans and
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IRAs has drawn the attention of regulators to the importance of investment
selection in retirement security (EBSA, 2011). Behavioral economists have
contributed to the debate by investigating questions such as whether invest-
ors benefit from an expanded set of investment alternatives (Benartzi and
Thaler, 2002). Among the research mandated by Congress after the finan-
cial crisis was a study of the regulation of financial planners by the Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO), an independent agency of the federal
government, and a study of the regulation of investment advisers and
broker-dealers by the Staff of the SEC (GAO, 2011b; SEC Staff, 2011b).
The SEC is responsible for regulation of the US capital markets and
investor protection. Next we explain legal issues as they relate to financial
advisers, provide some background on the history of those issues, and
update the status of regulatory efforts.
Conflicts of interest
The primary legal issues regarding investment advisers are grounded in
identification of the conflicts of interest that may exist in the provision of
investment advice and how best to mitigate such conflicts in ways that are
understandable to investors. The SEC is concerned with these issues as part
of its general mandate to protect investors and specifically in its interpret-
ation and enforcement of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers
Act). The Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) of the
Department of Labor has an overlapping regulatory interest because
of its mandate to regulate private-sector employee benefit plans, such as
401(k) plans, including regulation of the entities that provide services to
those plans and to the employees who participate in the plans. As discussed
below, the overlapping regulatory authority of the SEC and EBSA increases
the complexity of regulatory efforts. That complexity is increased further
through the involvement of the self-regulatory agency, FINRA, which regu-
lates broker-dealers including broker-dealers who provide investment
advice, and various state agencies that regulate advisers who engage in
securities-related transactions and sales of insurance products.
The US legal system uses three methods to mitigate conflicts of interest.
Those three methods are: (a) requiring disclosure, (b) prohibiting specified
actions, and (c) subjecting actions or actors to fiduciary duties. Each of these
methods is used in the context of investment advice. Turning to disclosure
first, the relevant legal standard may require that an actor such as an invest-
ment adviser disclose its conflicts of interest so that the client can consider
the existence of the conflicts when selecting an investment adviser and in
evaluating its recommendations. For advisers who are fiduciaries, disclosure
of conflicts of interest typically is part of the adviser’s general fiduciary duties.
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Specific disclosure requirements sometimes go beyond the general
fiduciary obligations. For example, advisers who register with the SEC
must disclose conflicts of interest in their public filings (SEC Staff, 2011b:
19, 22). Federal securities laws require broker-dealers to register with the
SEC and prohibit broker-dealers from engaging in fraudulent actions. The
prohibition on fraud results in an implied obligation to disclose significant
conflicts of interest. FINRA rules require broker-dealers to disclose conflicts
of interest in certain situations but the FINRA staff does not believe that
there is a general requirement that broker-dealers disclose their conflicts of
interest at the beginning of a client relationship or transaction (GAO,
2011b).
The second method of mitigating conflicts of interest—prohibition—
applies to some investment advice provided regarding benefit plan assets
through ERISA’s ban on ‘prohibited transactions.’ Prohibited transactions
include transactions where a fiduciary to a plan or an affiliate of the
fiduciary is compensated for providing investment advice to participants
in the plan (EBSA, 2011: 66,136). Exemptions from these prohibitions do
exist and permit actions by any party so long as the actions fit within the
terms of the exemption. EBSA has provided guidance and exemptions over
time regarding the provision of investment advice on benefit plan assets. As
explained later, legislation in 2006 provided a new, statutory prohibited
transaction exemption for certain transactions connected with the provi-
sion of investment advice (Muir, 2010).
The Advisers Act also contains categorical prohibitions relating to invest-
ment advice. For example, it prohibits investment advisers, whether regis-
tered with the SEC or not, from charging advisory fees based on account
performance. There are limited exceptions from that prohibition, such as
for advice provided to high net worth individuals.
The third legal response to conflicts of interest is to designate the
conflicted adviser as a fiduciary. Because of the complexity involved in
fiduciary obligation and the incentives established by such a designation
we address those matters next, and in some detail.
Investment advisers as fiduciaries
First we discuss the standard of conduct a fiduciary investment adviser must
meet and compare it with the standards applied to non-fiduciary advisers.
Next we describe the lines the current legal definitions draw between when
an investment adviser is a fiduciary and when an adviser is not a fiduciary.
Then we explain how the standards and the technical legal definitions
result in confusion among investors about whether the investment advice
they receive is provided by a fiduciary or a non-fiduciary adviser.
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The effect of fiduciary regulation on investment advisers
The legal obligations owed by a fiduciary to its clients significantly exceed
the obligations owed in traditional contracting relationships. The higher
standard is the point of imposing a fiduciary obligation to mitigate conflicts
of interest. The precise obligations of a fiduciary vary depending on factors
such as context and statutory provisions. There is general agreement
though that all fiduciaries must meet the basic duties of: (a) loyalty,
which requires the fiduciary to act in the client’s best interest, and (b)
care, which requires the fiduciary to act reasonably on the client’s behalf
(Laby, 2008: 105–6). The duty of loyalty responds directly to the threats
imposed by conflicts of interests and generally requires, among other
things, that a fiduciary subordinate its own interests to the interests of its
client (Laby, 2011: 1055).
ERISA implements the fiduciary duty of loyalty through its statutory
‘exclusive purpose rule.’ As a result, fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans, including 401(k) plans, must act for the purpose of providing plan
benefits and paying plan expenses and not for their own benefit. For
example, if management fiduciaries advised employees with employer
stock in their 401(k) plans not to tender company stock in a tender offer
in order to entrench management, that advice probably would violate the
exclusive purpose fiduciary obligation (Muir, 2002: 21).
Similarly, the Advisers Act requires an investment adviser to ‘serve the
best interests of its clients, which includes an obligation not to subordinate
the clients’ interests to its own’ (SEC Staff, 2011b : 22). The Advisers Act also
requires an investment adviser to disclose information on conflicts of
interest (SEC Staff, 2011b : 22).
In contrast with the fiduciary duty of loyalty, non-fiduciaries are often
referred to as interacting with others at ‘arm’s length.’ At arm’s length is
the standard that typically is applied to business transactions where each
party is expected to work or negotiate in its best interest. Black’s law
dictionary defines at arm’s length as: ‘Beyond the reach of personal influ-
ence or control . . . [w]ithout trusting to the other’s fairness or integrity’
(Black, 1983). Specifically, broker-dealers who are not fiduciaries because
they provide financial advice that is incidental to their work as broker-
dealers and do not receive ‘special compensation’ for the investment
advice are governed by a suitability standard—the advice must be suitable
for the client. Suitability is a lower standard than a requirement to act in a
client’s best interest. The standard of care required of insurance agents
depends on the law of the relevant state but may be a suitability standard
(GAO, 2011b: 16–17).
Understanding the effect of fiduciary regulation on investment advisers
requires understanding not just the obligations imposed on advisers but
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also the penalties imposed for fiduciary breach. ERISA permits EBSA or
individuals to bring lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duties and contains
potentially severe penalties. Those harmed by a fiduciary breach may
receive a monetary award to compensate for the harm. And, a court may
prohibit a breaching person or entity from acting as a fiduciary to other
ERISA plans (Stanley, 2000: 701). Some commentators have argued that
these relief provisions are insufficient to discourage illegal conduct
because punitive damages, pain and suffering, and similar kinds of relief
are not available (Schultz, 2011). By contrast, the Advisers Act does not
permit individual investors to bring lawsuits alleging fiduciary breach;
instead the SEC has enforcement authority (SEC 44). That authority per-
mits the SEC to impose a variety of remedies for fiduciary breach, including
monetary penalties and revocation of the adviser’s registration (SEC Staff,
2011b: 44, A-17).
The law imposes fiduciary standards and penalties for breach of those
standards in order to protect investors from conflicts. Entities that provide
investment advice may react to the fiduciary standards in one of three ways.
First, the investment adviser might comply with the fiduciary standards.
This may result in higher costs for advice as a result of compliance efforts
(e.g., SEC Staff, 2011b: 146). As is typical with regulation, the increased
costs that result from compliance may be passed along to the investors who
receive advice and to benefit plans that hire advice providers. The
increased costs may result in decreased use of investment advice. Second,
if the fiduciary standards are imposed by ERISA then the investment
adviser might refuse to provide advice regarding benefit plan assets.
Again, the result is that the imposition of the fiduciary standard would
result in a decrease in the amount of advice available to benefit plans
and to the individuals who earn benefits under the plans. The third
possibility is that an adviser may avoid the cost of fiduciary regulation by
providing investment advice in such a way that the adviser avoids being
categorized by the law as a fiduciary. Next we discuss the line drawing that
determines fiduciary status and the steps an adviser might take to avoid that
status.
Current legal definition of investment advisers as fiduciaries
As we noted earlier, various terms are used in the brokerage and advisory
industries to describe individuals and entities that provide advice on finan-
cial matters. Most of those terms do not have a precise legal definition.
However, since fiduciary status gives rise to significant duties, substantial
penalties for breach of those standards, and, thus, possibly an incentive to
avoid fiduciary status, the definition of when an investment adviser is a
fiduciary is important to both advisers and their clients. The regulators
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continue to struggle with the definitional questions. Here the complexity
resulting from overlapping regulation becomes apparent because each regu-
lator has a different definition for when an investment adviser is a fiduciary.
As a general matter, the Advisers Act defines the term ‘investment
adviser’ in a reasonably straightforward manner as an individual or entity
who is compensated for providing advice related to investments in secur-
ities. The Advisers Act’s requirements, including its fiduciary standards,
apply to any entity that fits within the definition. There are, however, a
number of exceptions from the definition of ‘investment adviser,’ including
broker-dealers who provide investment advice that is incidental to their
work as a broker-dealer and who do not receive ‘special compensation’ for
the advice. The result of the exceptions, especially when combined with the
various terminologies used in the industry, can be confusing for investors
who then find it difficult to determine whether their adviser is obligated
to work in their best interest or owes them only a duty to recommend a
suitable investment.
Under ERISA the standards are different. The statute contains alternate
ways a person interacting with a benefit plan or its assets might become a
fiduciary. The relevant language for investment advisers is that a person is a
fiduciary if ‘he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect . . . ’ (ERISA, 1974: Sec. 3(21)). This relatively clear
language, however, is complicated by regulations. The regulations have
long made clear that provision of investment education is not in itself a
fiduciary action (Muir, 2002: 18–19). Thus, a rational provider of invest-
ment-related services may choose to provide only investment education or
to charge higher fees for investment advice than for investment education.
This gives rise to legal issues over the line between investment advice and
investment education (Muir, 2002).
A second set of complications results from regulations issued in 1975 that
established a significantly narrower, five-part definition of when a provider
of investment advice becomes a fiduciary regarding benefit plan assets. In
summary, according to the regulations, an investment adviser is not a
fiduciary when giving advice regarding benefit plan assets or an IRA unless
the adviser (a) advises on securities valuation or makes recommendations
on the purchase or sale of securities, (b) on a regular basis, (c) according
to a mutual agreement with the plan or a plan fiduciary, (d) that provides
the advice will serve as the primary basis for decisions on investments,
and (e) the advice is individualized to the plan’s needs (EBSA, 2010).
By avoiding meeting this narrower regulatory definition when giving
advice, a financial adviser currently may give investment advice for a fee
regarding benefit plan assets but avoid the fiduciary obligations
imposed on an adviser who provides advice regarding the assets of a benefit
plan or IRA.
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Investor confusion resulting from industry practice
The complexities in the current definitions of when an adviser is a fiduciary
combined with the lack of uniform terminology, the variety of services an
adviser may provide, and the many different professional designations have
given rise to concerns that investors can be confused about the standard of
care owed to them by their adviser. A study by the GAO, an independent,
investigative agency that reports to Congress, of financial planners
observed that when one individual or firm provides a variety of services,
the standard of care may vary with the services. This finding was consistent
with an earlier study by the RAND Corporation of various perspectives on
investment adviser and broker-dealer services (Hung et al., 2008). The
variation of the standard of care with the type of service provided is
known as a ‘hat-switching’ problem. For example, if the financial planner
is purchasing securities for the client, the planner is wearing its broker-
dealer hat and owes only a duty of suitability. When the planner provides
advice under the classic Advisers Act definition of investment advice, the
planner is wearing its Advisers Act hat and must act in the client’s best
interest (GAO, 2011b). An additional point of confusion not discussed by
the GAO is that if the planner is providing advice regarding benefit plan
assets and meets ERISA’s definition of a fiduciary then the planner is
wearing its ERISA fiduciary hat. This results in application of a standard
of care similar to the Advisers Act fiduciary standard but, as explained
above, a different set of remedies if the standard of care is breached.
The GAO’s observations about the possibility of investor confusion are
backed up by other research. Focus group studies indicate that investors do
not understand the differences between investment advisers and broker-
dealers, including the different types of services the two groups provide and
the differences in their legal obligations (SEC Staff, 2011b). A larger study
identified the interlocking relationships between entities that offer a variety
of services, such as both brokerage and advisory services, as one source of the
difficulty investors have in teasing apart the obligations. The GAO has recom-
mended that a study the SEC is currently doing on the financial literacy of
investors includes an investigation into whether investors are confused by the
various certifications used and roles played by financial advisers and, if so,
whether the confusion affects investment decisions (GAO, 2011b).
Current rule making and reports on fiduciary
investment advisers
As noted above, the regulation of investment advisers has long been part of
the agendas of the SEC and EBSA. In recent years, the agencies have
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undertaken studies and proposed regulations regarding investment advice,
some of which have come at the direction of Congress. In 2006, the Pension
Protection Act (PPA) initiated EBSA regulatory efforts to expand access to
investment advice. The SEC and EBSA have issued reports and regulations
related to investment advice in the wake of the financial crisis and as
directed by Congress in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank, 2010). To explore these, we begin by discuss-
ing the agencies’ actions on the definitional question of what types of
actions are subject to fiduciary duties. Next we review recent regulations
that expand the ways in which advisers may offer investment advice to
401(k)-type plan participants and holders of IRAs. In a final section, we
explain efforts to expand the disclosure of fees charged in 401(k) plans.
In early 2011, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the Staff of the SEC
issued a report evaluating the regulation of investment advice provided by
both investment advisers and broker-dealers. As noted above, the Advisers
Act contains a broad definition of ‘investment adviser’ but excludes broker-
dealers from its regulation if the broker-dealer’s provision of advice is
incidental and it does not receive any ‘special compensation’ for the
advice. The SEC Staff ’s study of this bifurcated regulatory system con-
cluded that a unified federal fiduciary standard and regulatory system
should be applied to both investment advisers and to broker-dealers
when they provide individualized investment advice to retail customers
(SEC Staff, 2011b). If adopted, the unified standard would decrease the
incidence of the hat-switching problem. The report was controversial even
at the highest levels of the SEC. Three of the SEC Commissioners, those
who govern the SEC, voted to submit the Staff study to Congress, over the
objection of two Commissioners. The Dodd-Frank Act granted the SEC
authority to apply the same standards to broker-dealers as apply to invest-
ment advisers under the Advisers Act. There were indications that the SEC
would propose regulations on the topic in early 2012 (Christie, 2011) but
that effort has been delayed indefinitely while the SEC gathers cost–benefit
data (Zamansky, 2012). The SEC and Congress also are considering
changes to the way compliance examinations of investment advisers are
conducted, including the possibility of a self-regulatory organization with
authority for additional oversight (SEC Staff, 2011a).
On the fiduciary definitional question, in 2010 EBSA proposed a change
in its long-standing regulation defining when the provision of investment
advice regarding benefit plan or IRA assets results in fiduciary status. The
result would be that an investment adviser would no longer have to provide
individualized advice on a regular basis according to an agreement that the
advice would be the primary basis for the investment decision in order to be
considered a fiduciary of a benefit plan or IRA. The proposal would have
dramatically increased the scope of financial advisory activities that result in
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/9/2013, SPi
36 The Market for Retirement Financial Advice
a provider becoming a fiduciary when giving investment advice regarding
benefit plan or IRA assets. The proposed regulatory definition tracked the
general statutory definition and specifically stated that investment advice or
recommendations given to a plan participant or beneficiary or to an
investor regarding an IRA are a fiduciary act (EBSA, 2010). By decreasing
the ability of individuals and entities to avoid fiduciary status, the proposed
standard would have decreased the incidence of the hat-switching prob-
lem. In September 2011, EBSA withdrew the proposed regulations, which
had generated substantial controversy (DOL, 2011). Current indications
are that it will revise and re-propose the regulations in 2013 while continu-
ing to coordinate its efforts with the SEC.
As discussed above, both ERISA’s fiduciary and prohibited transactions
rules impose constraints on the provision of investment advice regarding
benefit plan assets. To date, investment advice provided by ERISA fiduciar-
ies, a role held by many large financial institutions, to holders of 401(k)
accounts typically has been structured to meet one of two models approved
by EBSA in opinion letters. The first is known as the SunAmerica model. It
allows financial entities to provide advice though computer models if the
computer models are developed and controlled by an independent third
party. The second model is the level fee model. It prohibits the investment
adviser’s compensation, or the compensation of any employer or affiliate of
the adviser, from varying as a result of the investment choices made
according to the advice (Muir, 2009).
In 2006, Congress enacted the PPA, which explicitly addressed the
regulation of investment advice provided in benefit plans, and theoretically
granted more flexibility to investment advice providers than existed under
the SunAmerica or level fee models. However, Congress left a number of
details in the PPA to be determined by EBSA through the regulatory
process. The agency’s initial regulations interpreting the PPA provisions
were extremely controversial, because they arguably provided more flexi-
bility than the legislation mandated, and were not implemented (Muir,
2009). After making significant revisions, EBSA finalized those regulations
and they became effective in December 2011.
The new regulations do not change the old fee leveling and computer
model platforms but do give advice providers alternative ways to structure
their advice products. In order to utilize either of the new exemptions, an
investment advice provider must meet a number of technical require-
ments. One of the requirements of the new regulations is that advisers
must request details from each investor regarding such factors as age, risk
tolerance, current investments, and other assets. Another is that any com-
puter model must take into account nearly all of the investment options
available in a plan including company stock. The requirements of fee
leveling do not extend to the affiliates of the adviser. Thus, if the adviser
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is affiliated with an entity that provides investment products, the fees of the
affiliate that result from the investment advice are permitted to vary
depending on the investments made as a result of that advice.
As discussed above, disclosure is one of the general mechanisms the law
uses to mitigate conflicts of interest. EBSA has taken action in the last few
years to enhance the disclosure of investment-related fees by issuing two
new regulations on fees. The first is effective for contracts as of July 2012,
requiring service providers who are fiduciaries or registered investment
advisers providing a broad array of services and expecting to receive at least
$1,000 in compensation to disclose that compensation to plan fiduciaries.
For certain services believed to be significant or to present possible
conflicts of interest, the services and costs must be described separately
even if the services and costs are bundled. The second regulation is linked
to the effective date of the fiduciary disclosure regulation and was generally
applicable in August 2012. It requires plans to provide participants
and beneficiaries in DC (e.g., 401(k)) plans with information about the
plan and with investment-related information including performance
data and fee and expense information related to investment alternatives
(EBSA, 2010).
Conclusion
Because of the dominance of 401(k) plans and IRAs in the US retirement
planning landscape, the market for financial advice is of increasing import-
ance to pension policy. Researchers have documented numerous factors,
from lack of financial sophistication to lack of interest, that inhibit individ-
uals from making optimal investment decisions. In contrast to the chal-
lenges faced by individuals who make their own investment decisions, the
US Department of Labor estimated that in 2010 financial advice saved
pension participants $15 billion in financial errors (EBSA, 2011). Policy-
makers and plan sponsors have recognized the potential benefits invest-
ment advisers can provide and, thus, have sought to enhance the quantity
and quality of financial advice available to individuals with IRA and 401(k)
accounts.
Our examination of the market for financial advice establishes several of
the market’s characteristics provide important flexibility and information
to advisory clients. Advisers engage with clients in a variety of ways, from
providing individualized advice to managing assets, which permits services
to be tailored to individual needs. The scope of advice provided may be
shaped to accommodate the level of complexity of a client’s financial
situation. Similarly, an individual interested in engaging an investment
adviser has access to a significant volume of information about the adviser
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as a result of federal disclosure requirements and numerous potential
professional certifications, in addition to the extensive marketing done
by some advisers. Finally, fee structures for investment advice vary in
numerous ways.
The flexibility and variability in the market for financial advice, how-
ever, also result in complexity that poses two related hazards. First, the
presence of conflicts of interest, which are inherent in some fee struc-
tures, may result in some advisers providing investment advice that is not
always in the best interest of their clients. The conflicts may not always
be obvious to the individuals and benefit plans that seek investment
advice. Second, because of the variety of certifications, different types
of financial market participants who provide advice, and layers of disclos-
ure and marketing materials, advisory clients may be unaware or con-
fused about the level of legal protections that govern their relationships
with their advisers. This is especially true when an adviser provides a
client with various services that are governed by different standards of
care, giving rise to the ‘hat-switching’ problem. The client may not
understand that the adviser must act in the client’s best interest in
some transactions but in others merely must provide advice suitable to
the client’s situation.
The regulatory framework addresses both conflicts of interest and invest-
ors’ informational requirements. The three mechanisms utilized by the
regulatory system—disclosure requirements, prohibitions on some actions,
and the imposition of fiduciary duty—are useful regulatory tools that
provide significant protection to participants and establish a floor for
industry standards. However, here too complexity has costs. For example,
the overlapping regulatory jurisdiction has resulted in a variety of different
disclosure requirements depending on the type of service being provided.
And, whether an advice provider is a fiduciary or not may depend on
whether the advice involves assets of a tax-favored retirement account.
These and other complexities sometimes result in confused investors and
a subset of advice providers who choose to operate in ways that may be less
than optimal for their clients or the advice industry. Regulatory efforts are
underway in the United States to address informational issues and to
rationalize the application of fiduciary standards, with the ultimate goal
being to increase the quality and quantity of investment advice to support
retirement security.
We have received excellent research assistance from Alexandra Kahn
and Jonathan Roselle, have benefited from discussions with Stephen Utkus
and Ron Gebhardtsbauer on some issues discussed in this chapter, and
have received valuable comments from Arthur Laby, Olivia S. Mitchell, and
Kent Smetters.
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Endnotes
1. Due to space limitations, we do not consider a number of related topics includ-
ing financial advice to individuals as small business owners, such as advice on
what type of pension plan to offer, or advice to individuals concerning tax
planning, estate planning, insurance, or obtaining a mortgage. We also exclude
advice to people with high net worth, because they are relatively few and pre-
sumably are more sophisticated investors than people with lower net worth.
Having high net worth does not guarantee that people are satisfied with the
financial advice they receive; one survey of affluent investors found that 85
percent was sufficiently dissatisfied as to consider switching advisers (Girouard,
2010). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2011a) defines for
purposes of its ADV Form an individual with high net worth as an individual
with at least $750,000 managed by one company, or whose net worth a company
reasonably believes exceeds $1,500,000. The net worth of an individual may
include assets held jointly with his or her spouse.
2. One financial columnist recommends financial advisers with the Certified
Financial Planner designation (Anspach, 2011b) and advisers with the Personal
Financial Specialist (PFS) designation, a designation that only Certified Public
Accountants (CPAs) can earn. For investment advisers, she recommends Char-
tered Financial Analysts (CFAs).
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